Abstract-In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), the research on key management of identity-based scheme is attracting more and more attention. In this paper, we study on four types of identity-based schemes which resist key escrow problem at different degrees, and introduce several schemes for each type.
scarce resources, and selfish nodes can drop data packets of other nodes.
Cryptographic schemes with key management are employed to provide a general design framework for secure MANETs. Traditional cryptographic systems can be divided into symmetric and asymmetric ones, depending on the way they use keys [4] . In symmetric schemes, the secret keys must be shared either by a secure pre-established channel or before network formation. If an attacker compromises the symmetric key of a group of users, then all encrypted messages for that group will be exposed. Therefore, traditional symmetric schemes are difficult to apply in MANETs. [5] The key management schemes of traditional asymmetric schemes are usually based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The success of certificate-based PKI depends on the availability and security of a Certificate Authority (CA), a central control point that everyone trusts. In a MANET, nodes have non-negligible probability to be compromised for the resource limitations of wireless devices and relatively poor physical protection. Once CA is compromised, the security of the network would be subverted. Another obstacle of using PKI's in MANETs is the heavy overhead of transmission and storage ofeliminate or reduce the risks of key escrow problem, several revised types of identity-based schemes have been made using multiple authority approaches. But meanwhile, they also cause some other new problems. For example, traditional threshold identity-based schemes [13] weaken the key escrow problem by distributing the PKG's service to multiple nodes, but they need to have a trust authority (TA) and provide the secure distribution of secret shares.
In this survey, we study on four types of identity-based key management schemes which resist key escrow problem at different degrees in MANETs: traditional threshold identity-based schemes, Secrete Shares as Private Keys (SSPK) identity-based schemes, certificateless schemes, and hierarchical identity-based schemes. Then, we discuss the approaches, strengths, and weaknesses of key management of these schemes, and provide a comparison between their main features.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of some background knowledge. Next, we describe the multiple identity-based key management schemes in section III, and then we present a comprehensive picture and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in following section. The final section draws our conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we start from reviewing the brief history and basic concepts of IBC, and subsequently introduce an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme and an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme based on the bilinear pairing, a computational primitive widely used to build up various identity-based cryptographic schemes in the current literature. Then we will present the basic idea of threshold cryptography, and describe one classical (t, n) threshold cryptography.
A. Identity-Based Cryptography
As mentioned earlier, in the IBC, the public key/secret key pair is generated by a PKG service, and the public key based on the own identity is assumed to be known by everyone. The idea of IBC was first proposed by Shamir [8] in 1984. Over years, a number of researchers tried to propose secure and efficient identity based encryption algorithms, but with little success. Boneh and Franklin [7] presented first fully functional, efficient and provably secure IBE scheme in 2001. At the same year, Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [14] proposed a basic IBS scheme using pairing.
In an IBE scheme, the sender can use the receiver's identity of public key to encrypt message, and the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext by his own private key obtained from the PKG according to his identity. The functions that compose a generic IBE are specified by the following four randomized algorithms [13] , [15] . (Fig. 1 illustrates a schematic outline of an IBE scheme.)
 Setup: takes a security parameter and returns system master private key SK and public key PK.  Extract: takes system parameters, master private key, and an identity as input, and returns a secret private key sk corresponding to the identity.  Encrypt: takes the master public key, the public key of the receiver node (derived from its identity), and the message as input, and returns the corresponding ciphertext.  Decrypt: takes the master public key, a ciphertext and the personal private key as input, and returns the decrypted message. In an IBS scheme, the singer first obtains a signing private key associated with its own identity from the PKG. It then signs a message using the private key, and the verifier verifies the signature using the signer's public key. An IBS scheme can also be described using four randomized algorithms [14] , [15] : Setup, Extract, Signing, and Verification. The former two steps are same to Setup and Extract of an IBE scheme. (Fig. 2 illustrates a schematic outline of an IBS scheme.)
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 Signing: uses own private key to create a signature on the message.  Verification: takes the master public key, the signature, the message and the public key of sender as input, checks whether the signature is a genuine signature on the message. If it is, returns "Accept". Otherwise, returns "Reject". e P Q for all
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The most frequently used assumptions are CDHP assumption and BDHP assumption, which means there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve CDH problem or BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: for 
B. Threshold Cryptography
In (t, n) threshold cryptography [16] , [17] , a cryptographic action divides a secret to n shareholders. Any t or more shareholders can combine their shares to deduce the secret. But any combination of t-1 shares does not yield any significant information about the secret. So, in such a way, the cryptographic action can be performed if and only if at least a certain number of parties collaborating. By this principle, in identity-based and threshold distributed key management scheme, the PKG's service is distributed to multiple parties [13] . More details, the master private key SK is shared by n nodes in a (t, n) threshold fashion. Each of them holds a unique secret share of the master private key SK, and no one is able to reconstruct the master private key based on its own information. Any t or more nodes among them can reconstruct the mater private key jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most t-1 nodes to do so, even by collusion.
One classical (t, n) threshold cryptography [18] was proposed by Shamir in 1979, which is based on polynomial interpolation. To distribute a secret s among n users, a trust authority chooses a large prime q and randomly selects a random t-1 degree polynomial f(x), with f(0)=SK. The trust authority computes each user's share using ( )mod 
III. IDENTITY-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
To tackle the inherent key escrow problem of IBC, several proposals have been made using multiple approaches. Many identity-based schemes for MANETs combine Shamir's threshold scheme to distribute the PKG service to an aggregation of nodes (PKGs), then no single node knows the private keys of all nodes, thus the key escrow problem of PKG is weakened. Actually, Shamir's threshold cryptography is suggested earlier then IBC to secure ad hoc networks by Zhou et al. [19] in 1999. Khalili et al. [13] suggest a mechanism that combines efficient techniques from identity-based and threshold cryptography to provide a mechanism that enables flexible and efficient key distribution while respecting the constraints of ad-hoc networks. In their system, IBC primarily provides efficiency gains, and threshold cryptography provides resilience and robustness.
However, Shamir's threshold secret sharing scheme has two major weaknesses. First, the scheme needs a TA to distribute a secret to users. Second, the scheme does not detect the distributed erroneous shares and the false shares provided by some compromised users. Deng et al. [20] , [21] proposed a secret sharing scheme without TA, instead, users choose the secret and distribute it among themselves, based on the work [22] . To testify the correctness of the shares, a SSPK identity-based scheme [23] using Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [24] was proposed. What's more, in the threshold secret sharing phase of [23] , nodes use secret VSS shares as private keys, which is different from traditional threshold identity-based schemes, and that's why we put it as a separate type. Still, given enough time an adversary could corrupt enough serve users (t PKGs) and obtain their shares to reconstruct the secret. To defend against such mobile attacks [25] , a proactive secret sharing scheme [26] using shares refreshing to compute new shares and remove the old shares was proposed.
Although above threshold identity-based schemes can weaken the key escrow problem at server level. There still remain risks of t PKGs being compromised. Hence, the key escrow problem is not completely addressed. AlRiyam and Paterson [27] first proposed a certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) that combines the advantages of IBC and PKI and overcomes the key escrow limitation of IBC. We will study on some certificateless schemes for MANETs [28] , [29] , [30] because certificateless-based schemes enjoy a number of features of IBC, though they are not purely identity-based.
Besides multiple identity-based schemes for flat MANETs, there are also some hierarchical identity-based schemes [31] , [32] , [33] for hierarchical MANETs. Considering the spatial concurrency constraints on nearby nodes sharing the same channel and the organization of the network may already be hierarchical in nature, so a hierarchical key management structure could serve well for applications of lager scale or of hierarchy. The good news is that hierarchical identity-based schemes also allow key escrow free at server levels.
In the following part, we will describe above identitybased key management schemes more detailedly.
A. Traditional Threshold Identity-Based Schemes
In traditional threshold identity-based schemes, the parameters of the cryptosystem, like master public/private key pair, will be, generally speaking, established by an online/offline TA or by other way before network deployment. The master public key PK is known to all nodes in the network, whereas the secret private key SK is divided into n shares S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n , one share for each server node in a t-out-of-n threshold manner. Each of server nodes holds a unique secret share of the master private key SK, and no one is able to reconstruct the master private key based on its own information. These multiple server nodes act as the threshold PKGs of an ID-based scheme, and any t server nodes can work together to issue personal secret private keys to nodes (including themselves) in MANETs based on their identities and key issuance policy, whereas it is infeasible for at most t-1 nodes to do so, even by collusion.
Instead of assuming that prior keying material or trust/security associations (TA) exist, Khalili et al. establish these at the time of network formation. In more detail, they propose that (at the time of network formation) the participating nodes generate a master public key PK in a distributed fashion. The master secret key SK will be shared in a t-out-of-n threshold manner by this initial set of n nodes called PKGs.
At the time of network formation, the initial nodes decide on a mutually acceptable set of security parameters, including a threshold t of key service nodes, the number (n) and identity of key service nodes, particular parameters of underlying schemes (e.g. key lengths), and a policy for key issuance. This initial set of nodes will generate the master public/private keys in a distributed manner such that fewer than t nodes cannot recover the master secret key. The master public key is given to all members of the network when they join. Usually, an identity can be something present in transmitted messages, like the network layer (or MAC) address, and all nodes in the network can use their identities as their personal public keys. When a new node join the network, it presents its identity or public key and any extra material specified by the key issuance policy to t or more PKGs providing the PKG service, then it will receives a share of their personal private key from each of them. The new joining node can then compute its personal private key using the t shares.
They recommend Boneh-Franklin scheme [7] as IBE scheme and Cha and Cheon [10] scheme as IBS scheme. These two schemes use similar elliptic-curve groups, and hence can be combined for greater efficiency in a relatively straightforward manner. All subsequent communications in their scheme are encrypted and decrypted using the master public key and the ID of the recipient.
In the Khalili et al. scheme, however, technical details of key generation are not given. Lots of identity-based schemes [34] - [36] in MANET are proposed based on the idea of their scheme. Among them, Deng et al. [20] , [21] make a detailed implementation of [13] idea and propose a distributed key generation (distribution) and authentication approach by deploying the concepts of IBC and threshold secret sharing. In these schemes, key generation provides the network master key pair and the public/private key pair of each node in a distribute way. Key generation consists of three components: master key generation, distributed private key generation, new master key share creation for new joining nodes.
Master key generation: The master key pair is computed collaboratively by the initial network nodes without constructing the master private key at any single node. This scheme is an extension to Shamir's secret sharing without the support of a TA. Each node i randomly chooses a secret x i and a polynomial
, and the master private key Private Key Generation: The requesting node i presents its public key pk i and self-generated temporary public key pk i -temp when it joins the network and sends private key generation request. Each of the t PKGs sends encrypted share . After the requesting node gets its new private key, it discards its temporary public/private key pair, and keeps the new key pair in its memory for the later authentication and communication.
Master key share creation for new joining nodes: Every new joining node will be the PKG service node, in other word, these schemes fully distribute the functionality of PKG to the entire nodes of the network. After private key generation process, the requesting node i obtains its new private key. . When the public key is expired, the node needs to obtain its new public key and update corresponding private key. The generated private keys are used for authentication, providing endto-end authentication and confidentiality between the communicating nodes. If the authentication process succeeds, the two communicating nodes calculate a symmetric session key, which can be used for future data encryption/decryption. Ref. [20] , [21] refer three authentication method: a sign-and-encryption procedure, in which digital signature [7] is used for the authentication of messages and encryption [37] is used for the confidentiality of messages; By modifying the identity-based cryptosystem slightly, the communicating nodes can generate a shared secret (session key) on both sides without additional key exchange [38] ; The lightweight authentication and encryption is implemented by applying the concepts of identity-based signcryption [8] and one-way hash chain [39] . Instead of encrypting subshares of private key using temporary public key, Li et al. [26] suggest a signcryption scheme [40] to secure the subshares' transmission. Moreover, they use modified multicast protocol and key proxy technology to reduce traffic and increase safety of key management when nodes update their private keys or PKG server nodes refresh their shares of master private key. They detail three components of key management: (master) key generation, update of a node's private key, and share refreshing of server nodes.
Key Generation: At the initial time of the network, an offline TA generates system secret key SK and public key PK. Every initial node must contact TA and register its identity before entering the network. After TA authenticates identity of the node, it actes as PKG and generates private key of the node using system secret key and the node's identity. Then the private key of the node and the system public key are given to the node securely. TA chooses n nodes as online PKG server nodes (PKGs) according to abilities of the nodes. Then the master private key SK is shared by the n server nodes using an (t, n) threshold sharing scheme. In addition, the offline TA publishes a piece of verification information consisting of i SP for each server node i to check malicious PKG server nodes as we will show later. The offline TA will leave the network after key generation succeeds.
The lifetime of the network is divided up in time periods, where each time period consists of two phases, the operational phase and the share update phase. During the operational phase, all nodes including server nodes renew their private keys. During the share update phase, all server nodes compute new shares from old ones in collaboration. At the j-th time interval, node A uses (ID A ||j) as its public key, where "||" represents concatenation of strings.
Update of a node's private key: All server nodes form and maintain a few multicast groups according to location, and each group has more than t server nodes. Node A floods its RREQ (Routing REQuset) to find a route to the online PKG server nodes group. When it receives RREPs (Routing REPly) from server nodes, it selects a server node, say u, which has the shortest path to itself as its key proxy. The routing information to the node u is stored. Before time interval j expires, it sends its PREQ to u and u multicasts the PREQ to all server nodes in the same group. Each server node i having received the request computes a subshare of private key A i pk S  for the node A using its share of system secret key S i , then it sends a PREP message containing the subshare to the key proxy u. Node u waits for some time and checks whether it has received t or more subshares from different server nodes. If it is true u will return to node A all these subshares in a single PREP packet. Then node A can compute a new valid private key using Lagrange interpolation as we can see before. Otherwise, node u will multicast the same PREQ again until the number of partial private keys received is larger than t. It is possible that a malicious server node i may return a false partial private key generated without using its share. To check the validity of partial key it receives from i, node A needs to check whether the equation ) , ( , and the shares refreshing information is sent using multicast. Every server node j in the same group can receive refreshing information from node i, and can only decrypt ciphertext c j to recover S ij and learn nothing about other subshare S ik , i≠k. After node j gets the sub-shares They point out there are two methods for communicating nodes to create a secret session key: key agreement using IBS by two parts, and session key generated by one part.
This scheme relies on an offline TA to form a trust anchor, which improves security level of the network. The multicast group of PKGs is fundamental in the scheme, but a critical question remaining open in this work is how the multicast group is formed.
Schemes [13] , [20] , [21] conduct a distributed PKG and weaken the key escrow problem of PKG up to the threshold t, which means an adversary should corrupt at least t PKG service nodes in the worst case, if it wants to obtain the private keys of all nodes. Here, we denote the degree of resistance to key escrow (DRKE) of [13] , [20] , [21] is t. In [26] , due to the new shares being independent of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to recover the secret. Thus, secret refreshing mechanism reduces the risk of mobile attacks and weakens the key escrow problem at higher level than [20] , [21] . But the DRKE of [26] is also t.
B. SSPK Identity-Based Schemes
Saxena [23] proposes a scheme of public key cryptography for MANETs analogous to IBC above. They use a Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [24] as a key distribution scheme, and the major difference from traditional threshold identity-based schemes, as we mentioned before, is that they use the secret shares as the private keys. In the proposed scheme the private keys are related (they are points on a polynomial of degree t-1) and each public key can be computed from the public VSS information and the node identifier. The usage of shares as private keys can also be viewed as a thresholdtolerant identity-based cryptosystem under standard discrete logarithm based assumptions.
They use Feldman's VSS based Shamir's threshold cryptography to share the master secret private key. A dealer chooses a secret sharing polynomial . Now, any user can send encrypted messages to user i using its public key pk i ,and user i can decrypt using its secret key sk i as ElGamal encryption [41] . Similarly, user i can use sk i to sign messages, which can be publicly verified using pk i using Schnorr signature scheme [42] . Moreover, any two users i and user j can establish pairwise keys in a non-interactive version of the DiffieHellman pairwise key establishment protocol: user i computes mod In a VSS identity-based scheme, a trusted dealer provides each user with a secret value as the private key derived from the unique identifier of the user, and publishes the VSS information as its public key. Knowing the identifier of a particular user and also the public key of the trusted center, one can send encrypted messages and verify signatures. This is equivalent to IBE of [7] and IBS of [10] , apart from the fact that our scheme becomes insecure if there is more than a threshold of collusions or corruptions. What's more, unlike other identity-based schemes, the proposed usage of shares as private keys is under standard discrete logarithm based assumptions, and that is much more efficient than these prior IBC schemes requiring costly computations (such as scalar point multiplications, map-to-point operations and bilinear mappings [7] ) in elliptic-curves. But the dealer who holds the secret sharing polynomial can compute the private key of all nodes, so the key escrow problem is not addressed or weakened.
C. Certificateless Schemes
CL-PKC enjoys a number of features of IBC while without having the problem of key escrow. LV et al. [28] , [29] present a virtual private key generator (VPKG)-based escrow-free certificateless public key cryptosystem for MANETs as a novel combination of certificateless and threshold cryptography. In their schemes, VPKGs collaboratively calculate the partial private key and send it to the node via public channel. The private key sk i of node i is generated jointly by the VPKG and the node itself. Each of them has "half" of the secret information about sk i .
In the initialization phase, an offline trust authority (TA) create some system parameters, and picks a secret key SK and a secret polynomial 
..,n, to the n virtual PKG nodes in an offline way. Then P SK PK   is the public key of the system. After network initialized, TA leaves the network, and the distributed VPKGs will be in charge of calculating private keys for nodes.
A mobile node i picks a secret s i for itself and selects a nearby server node, say u as its combiner (similar to key proxy). Then, node u finds other t-1 server nodes and sends ID i (and public key pk i ) to them. When the combiner u receives all shares from the other t-1 server nodes via public channels, it can compute the partial private key and then sends the partial private key to the requesting node i.
In [28] , the public key of node i is 
ii B e sk P  for verifying the authenticity of the public key pk i . Those two schemes respectively introduce how the above key pairs <pk i ,sk i >are used to perform encryption/decryption using the Boneh-Franklin scheme [7] .
LV et al. bind the public key of node i with its identity and its partial private key respectively, which raises their schemes to the same trust level as is enjoyed in a traditional PKI. Furthermore, with this binding, it does not need to keep the partial private keys secret, and the VPKG can send them back to the users via public channels.
Li et al. [30] also present a novel distributed key management scheme, a combination of certificateless public key cryptography and threshold cryptography. They point that each public/private key pair is both nodespecific and phase-specific and node A's key pair valid only during phase p i is denoted by unchanged during network lifetime and should be kept confidential to A itself. They also employ key revocation and key update in the scheme and describe a key agreement to compute a shared session key.
In certificateless schemes, the private key of the user is generated collaboratively by the user and the VPKGs that calculates one part of a user's private key and sends it to the user via public channel. Each has half of the private information about the private key of the user. Thus there is no private key secure distribution problem. In addition, the user's partial private key is known only to the user itself, therefore there is no key escrow problem.
D. Hierarchical Identity-Based Schemes
Usually, a MANET is assumed to be homogeneous or flat, where all nodes have the same communication capabilities. A recent theory study in [43] presents the throughput bounds of homogeneous MANETs. The limitation is fundamentally due to the spatial concurrency constraints on nearby nodes sharing the same channel. These results strongly suggest that we should consider a hierarchical structure to solve the MANETs problem [44] . Recently, hierarchical ad hoc networks have been presented as an alternative topology to homogeneous ad hoc topologies. Initial measurements indicate that the hierarchical approach has better performance than homogeneous ad hoc network [45] . In addition, a hierarchical key management scheme could serve well for some special applications, e.g. military where the organization of the network may already be hierarchical in nature. In hierarchical key management, an upper level TA/PKG needs only distribute keys to the layer below it, and the distribution process continues until all the endnodes get their secret keys from the layer above them. This hierarchy of PKG nodes greatly reduces the workload on master servers and allows key escrow free at server levels [27] .
The first hierarchical identity-based encryption was proposed in [46] . The scheme is only two levels where a pairing-based scheme is placed at the top level and a polynomial-based scheme is at the second level. Their encryption functionality can support key agreement, but it requires user interaction. Gennaro et al. [31] reverses the order, using the polynomial scheme for all the top levels and the pairing-based scheme only for the leaves to supports the non-interactive property.
Gennaro et al. propose that an authenticated key agreement protocol for MANETs should have the four functional properties: non-interactive to save on bandwidth, identity-based to save on coordination and support ad-hoc communication, hierarchical to allow for flexible provisioning of nodes, and be fully resilient against compromise of any number of leaf nodes and resilient against compromise of a "threshold" of nodes in the upper levels.
Their goal is to build a hierarchical identity-based key agreement scheme that has all the above functional properties and is secure in a strong sense. Their scheme is a combination of linear hierarchical schemes with the non-interactive identity-based key-agreement scheme. It describes two special linear hierarchical schemes: multivariate polynomials [47] scheme and subset-based key pre-distribution [48] scheme. In their scheme, each leaf can compute the shared key between other peer leaf node from its own secret key, its peer's identity, and potentially some other public information.
They discuss three trade-offs that one can make when choosing a key-agreement scheme for a particular application, that is "Set threshold value", "Polynomials vs. Subsets" and "Choosing the curves". They also implement the key-generation by the root and keydelegation between internal nodes.
Unlike other hierarchical key management schemes that rely on parent nodes to act as the PKG who supplies the private key, the method introduced in [31] distributes the role of the PKG among a threshold of siblings, that is, nodes at the same level. But the method stops short of discussing a systematic way of choosing the threshold of nodes to act as the PKG. Considering security conditions and energy states of node, Yu et al. [49] proposed a revised version of Gennaro et al.'s scheme with selection of the best nodes to be used as PGKs from all available ones.
The protocols above are indeed well motivated in terms of their applicability in hierarchical MANETs and are secure against the corruption of any leaves. Unfortunately, their schemes are not designed against the corruption of the nodes of the higher levels in the hierarchy. Guo et al. [32] present an efficient hierarchical non-interactive identity-based key agreement protocol based on the pairing cryptography, and it satisfies the desired properties mentioned in [31] . It can resist against any corrupted nodes in the entire hierarchy not only in low levels. Moreover, their scheme captures the dynamic property as in Gennaro et al.'s scheme, i.e., nodes can be added to the hierarchy without requiring any further coordination with other nodes and without changing the information held by other nodes. What's more, this scheme isn't based on a threshold-based hierarchical scheme. So, it does not need to set any threshold value. This paper describes algorithms for Setup, Key generation, and Key agreement.
Setup: The key agreement scheme root chooses a set of information for the scheme, such as the maximal depth L of the hierarchy, number of nodes, security parameters, cryptographic functions, domain of keys, etc. It also randomly selects master secret keys 
, where 
, and B computes
Compared with the other existing schemes, this scheme offers much better performance on the bandwidth consumption, the computational cost, and the storage cost in the case where depth L is relatively small. However, once anyone of node A's ancestor nodes is compromised, the private key of A will be constructed. We will refer to this property as "Ancestors' security matters". Yet it is still an open problem to design an efficient key agreement scheme for a hierarchical MANETs with a large depth.
Tseng et al. [33] present the design of Halo, a hierarchical identity-based public key infrastructure that uses hierarchical identity-based cryptography, verifiable secret sharing [24] and threshold/joint secret sharing. Halo was designed to overcome two well-known hurdles: "Absence of Server infrastructure" and "Demand for Opportunistic Collaboration".
In their scheme, each entity (except the leaf node) will choose a secret of their own, and use it to generate the private key of its descendant at the next level. To avoid malicious PKG, they distribute this key among multiple PKGs using the threshold Shamir's secret sharing cryptography [18] to disperse the risks. It extends Shamir's secret sharing scheme by obtaining the secret shares from the additions of contributions from multiple polynomials as we described in [20] , [21] . What's more, after categorizing authorities into different cohorts according to their hashed ID value, it will be able to add up shares from different level but same cohort, and recover the secret using polynomial interpolation.
This HIBE contains five algorithms, that is, Root Setup, Lower-Level Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt.
Root Setup is similar to the master key generation of [20] , [21] . After Root Setup, multiple root authorities decide the secret sharing function f(x) with f(0)=SK 0 , secret share f(c i ) of its cohort c i , and corresponding qualified set Q-value (Q 0 ).
Lower It also discusses the cryptographic mechanisms provided by Halo including the identity-based encryption (HIBE), signature (HIBS) and signcryption (HIBES) operations.
In [32] , any node (except leaf node) can obtain the private keys of its children nodes and the root keeps the master secret keys, so the key escrow isn't weakened. In scheme of [33] and polynomial scheme of [31] , the PKG at each level (i) is distributed to a threshold (t i ) of siblings, thus the DRKE is Table I gives an overview of the characteristics of key management of identity-based schemes we mainly introduced above. And the capabilities of keys (the master key pair and private key) generation and distribution are summarized in Table II. As we can see in Table I , IBC for MANETs is often combined with threshold cryptography to eliminate single-point of failure and resists compromise or insider attack by distributing the PKG service to multiple nodes. Furthermore, with the (t, n) threshold cryptography, honest parties need only contact any t nodes for purpose of obtaining their own key, thus making the protocol resilient to temporary loss of connectivity with other nodes in the network. Secure key generation and distribution are not trivial and required in key management. To improve safety of key generation and distribution, many techniques, such as master key generation in a distributed manner, key proxy, share refreshing, and VSS are proposed to combine with the traditional threshold identity-based mechanism, which is showed in Table II . Threshold identity-based schemes weaken the key escrow problem of PKG (up to the threshold t). In certificateless schemes, the private key of node is comprised of two parts, and the PKG does not have access to the user's own secret private key, so certificateless schemes completely address key escrow. What's more, even if adversaries have the entire network lifetime to mount mobile attacks and they compromise or disrupt enough PKGs, a threshold identity-based scheme using certificateless cryptography can prevent adversaries to derive the private keys of nodes from the compromised PKGs. Thus, this scheme also resists against mobile attacks.
A MANET is usually assumed to be homogeneous, where each mobile node shares the same radio capacity. However, a homogeneous ad hoc network often suffers from poor scalability. Ref. [50] observed that, when using the same amount of sensor nodes in a given coverage area for flat and hierarchical topologies, that the system throughput capacity increases, while system delay decreases. Ref. [51] showed that a hierarchical key management scheme is a very promising way to achieve good scalability. Meanwhile, the hierarchy of PKG service nodes reduces normal nodes' exposure to the compromised PKG nodes, thus hierarchical identitybased schemes weaken the key escrow problem. By the way, there are some other techniques we don't introduce to eliminate or weaken key escrow of IBC, such as, certificate-based cryptosystem [52] , reducing the trust of PKG [53] .
There are two points that needs to be noted in identitybased schemes for MANETs. First, in threshold-based schemes, the threshold parameter t controls the trade-off between security and service availability. Choosing a value of 1 for t causes the least security while keeping highest service avail ability. On the other hand, selecting a value of n for t results a maximum security but weak service availability. Second, the new node can only contact its 1-hop neighbors, and if no enough nodes are in proximity then it cannot obtain a key. Deng et al. suggest that the node moves in order to find a sufficient number of PKGs. More seriously, nodes have to trust their 1-hop away neighbors to route all information. It makes scheme more vulnerable to Sybil attacks [54] , in which a single node presents multiple identities to others. But this problem can be addressed by periodically refreshing the master key, and introducing a trust management technique [55] and an Intrusion Detection System.
A. Techniques to Improve Identity-Based Scheme
Key management is an important part of secure communication that is responsible for secure key generation, key distribution and key maintenance. Here are techniques in the literature to improve security and availability of key management of identity-based scheme for MANETs.
 Improved threshold cryptography for key generation and distribution: The master key pair is generated by the initial nodes in a distributed manner, and there is no need of TA to distribute secrets of master private key to nodes. To counter mobile attacks, we suggest secret refreshing mechanism in which secret shares are updated in intervals and new shares cannot be combined with old ones to recover the secret. To secure the share of private key transmission, we can employ VSS to verify integrity of secret shares of threshold cryptography.  Certificateless cryptography to eliminate key escrow:
Certificateless cryptography completely addresses the key escrow problem and mobile attacks by having the user contribute to the private key generation.  Hierarchical for special MANETs: We can take the hierarchical cryptography into consideration if the organization of the network is hierarchical in nature or the network requires good scalability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Several cryptographic mechanisms for secure MANETs can be found in the literature. Among them, identity-based cryptography, a special form of public key cryptography, is more suitable for bandwidth-limited and resource-constrained MANETs, because it eliminates the requirement for a certificate authority and public key certificates. In this survey paper, we have divided identity-based key management schemes for MANETs into four types: traditional threshold identity-based schemes, SSPK identity-based schemes, certificateless schemes, and hierarchical identity-based schemes. Then we have studied one or more typical schemes for each type, and discussed their approaches, strengths, and weaknesses. Last, we have made a summary of their key management and keys generation and distribution, and pointed out the trade-off problem of threshold parameter t and 1-hop-trust problem. During the survey, we also suggest some techniques to improve the security of key management of identity-based scheme for MANET. How to combine those effective security techniques to secure the key management is one of our future works.
We have mentioned many properties of IBC that make it especially attractive for MANETs. However, there are still some problems not completely addressed and impedes application of IBC, e.g. identity disclosure, key revocation, high computations in elliptic-curve. We will try to explore deeper in these research areas. 
